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Where a plaintiff was attacked by a goose, the common-law doctrine of ferae naturae, that a defendant cannot be liable for the actions of wild animals if it does not exercise dominion, control or possession over them, precludes relief for the plaintiff’s negligence claims but not the plaintiff’s premises liability claim.
“Plaintiff, Eric Leiendecker, was attacked by a goose while leaving one of Ascension Genesys Hospital’s facilities where he worked as a contractor. Plaintiff suffered injuries requiring surgery and sued Ascension and its security vendor, Teachout Security Services (Teachout), for negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary disposition for both defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted), relying on the common-law doctrine of ferae naturae, that a defendant cannot be liable for the actions of wild animals if it does not exercise dominion, control, or possession over them. We agree that ferae naturae precludes relief for plaintiff’s negligence claims against defendants, but not plaintiff’s premises liability claim against Ascension. Thus, we reverse the dismissal of plaintiff’s premises liability claim against Ascension only, and affirm in all other respects. …
“A goose is a wild animal and plaintiff’s negligence claims against defendants were properly dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(8) citing Glave [v Michigan Terminix Co, 159 Mich App 537; 407 NW2d 36 (1987)]. But because plaintiff alleged that the goose was a condition of the land whose dangerousness was known to Ascension, and Ascension failed to warn plaintiff about the dangerous goose, he has raised a legally sufficient premises liability claim against Ascension. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the negligence claims against Teachout and Ascension, reverse as to Ascension on the premises liability claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Concurring judge’s comments
YATES, P.J. (concurring). “As Michiganders know, geese can be foul-mannered, like wild or domesticated animals of all sorts. And when animals attack, victims are not concerned about whether the attackers are wild or domesticated. But under common law, the doctrine of ferae naturae just applies to wild animals, and a goose is a wild animal, so the trial court invoked that doctrine to absolve the property owner, Ascension Genesys Hospital (Ascension), of liability by awarding it summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) of plaintiff’s claim of premises liability. In doing so, the trial court decided that a property owner can never be responsible on a premises-liability theory for the injuries caused by a wild animal, even when the owner invites a contractor onto property where a wild animal has persistently caused injuries to those who dare to set foot on the land. I do not believe that Michigan premises-liability law allows for such a sweeping exemption from liability when the owner knows of the danger, but chooses to do nothing to warn or protect invitees who may suffer injuries at the hands (or claws or beaks) of wild animals, so I join the majority ruling that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition under the standards applicable to analysis under MCR 2.116(C)(8).”
BOONSTRA, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). “The “goose” here is the doctrine of domitae naturae, while the “gander” is the doctrine of ferae naturae. Domitae naturae relates to domesticated animals, while ferae naturae relates to wild animals. … Both are long-standing doctrines of our common law, but they are distinct doctrines, they apply in distinctly different ways, and they require distinctly different results in our legal system.
“But the majority conflates them, and in doing so it opens the floodgates to a potential gaggle of claims that are simply not recognized in the common law. Until now, at least. But the majority has now determined that those on whose land wild animals enter may find themselves subject to legal theories of liability that have never before been recognized in Michigan. They may find that their goose is indeed cooked. The majority accomplishes this by ignoring Michigan caselaw and by altering our common law despite lacking the authority to do so. I must therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Ascension Genesys Hospital on plaintiff’s premises liability claim. I otherwise concur in the majority opinion.”
