Summary
- 6th Circuit says people with severe disabilities may pursue ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims involving foster parent licensing.
- Court held Michigan could not categorically exclude people with disabilities from becoming foster parents.
- The plaintiff’s proposed accommodation involving paid and informal caregivers was deemed insufficiently concrete and unreasonable.
A quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair who applied to be a foster parent could bring claims of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, but summary judgment for the state was appropriate where her proposed accommodation was unreasonable, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled.
“[C]ategorically precluding individuals with severe physical disabilities from being foster parents may violate the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, since these laws require an individualized assessment of whether, with a reasonable accommodation, an applicant can fulfill their parenting responsibilities,” Circuit Judge Rachel S. Bloomekatz wrote. “But [the plaintiff’s] proposed accommodation to meet the physical needs of any potential foster children was unreasonable, so we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.”
Senior Circuit Judge Jane Branstetter Stranch and Circuit Judge John K. Bush joined the panel in the 17-page opinion Metcalf v. State; MiLW No. 01-111108.
Matthew T. Wise of Gordon & Rees in Bloomfield Hills, who represented the private licensing agency the state contacted with and associated individuals, said the court made the right decision.
“What this case boiled down to was if Michigan needed to fundamentally alter how people are licensed for foster care,” he said. “Both the district court and the 6th Circuit agreed there was no need to invalidate this law. Perhaps it’s not perfect, but at the end of the day, this was about taking care of the safety and well-being of children and balancing that with an applicant’s rights.”
Collin H. Nyeholt of The Law Offices of Casey D. Conklin in Okemos, who represented the plaintiff, declined to comment on the decision.
Lansing attorney Marissa Wiesen represented the state and individual defendants on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General, which did not respond to a request for comment.
Foster license application
The plaintiff was paralyzed from the neck down in a car accident. She retains only slight mobility in her left arm and moves through daily life with the aid of a powered wheelchair. She also relies upon a network of formal and informal care, consisting of full-time aides that assist her with all day-to-day physical activities, as well as family and friends who help through informal arrangements.
She has served as a primary caretaker for multiple children, including her niece and nephew for several years. She applied to become a foster parent through the Division of Child Welfare Licensing (DCWL) of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
A private agency, Ennis Center, conducted the background investigation and orientation, which the plaintiff successfully completed.
The law also requires a physician to attest that each member of the applicant’s household “does not have a known condition that would affect the care of the foster child.” Her physician checked “yes” to multiple questions on the form, including if there were “any physical or mental factors that would jeopardize the physical or mental welfare of any children placed in” the plaintiff’s care.
Following two home visits, an Ennis Center employee concluded that granting the plaintiff a foster license would violate the regulations. The DCWL administratively closed her application, but did not deny it (meaning she could reapply at any time).
She responded with a lawsuit against the state, the Ennis Center, the DCWL and various individuals alleging that the defendants discriminated against her in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, that Michigan laws facially violate both statutes and that the individual defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating her differently because of her disability.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court sided with the defendants. The plaintiff appealed.
No reasonable accommodation
The plaintiff acknowledged that her quadriplegia prevents her from performing certain physical tasks required of caregivers but maintained that her network of formal and informal aides could provide the necessary support and function as a reasonable accommodation.
The rejection of this accommodation constituted discrimination, she told the court.
But the court disagreed, as “the record shows that she has not secured that help or even proffered a plan to do so,” the court wrote. “Thus, based on this record, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on [the plaintiff’s] as-applied ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.”
The defendants argued that she did not request an accommodation, but the court pointed out that given her physical limitations, “it was not a question that she would need assistance in caring for foster children.” She also asked questions during the process about whether her aides would need to take foster care classes or be certified.
Considering whether her proposed accommodation was reasonable, the court agreed with the defendants that her existing network of aides did not make her properly prepared to meet all of a foster child’s physical needs.
The foster care system does not require all persons in a household with a foster child to be licensed, so the court was not persuaded that the plaintiff’s aides would need separate licensure.
But the defendants presented unrebutted testimony that her no-fault insurance did not allow her full-time, paid aides to assist any other person, and insurance covered the cost of meeting her physical needs only.
“[She] did not plan to increase these aides’ pay if she were to foster a child,” the court said. “Quite the opposite, she minimized how much fostering children could increase their responsibilities, surmising that it would not add a significant burden give that they already cooked, cleaned, and transported her.”
The informal network of support “likewise does not provide assurance that [the plaintiff] could meet the physical needs of foster children,” the court added. “We do not discount the value that informal networks play in raising children. But we agree with the defendants that placing foster children in [her] care without more concrete assurance that [she] could reliably meet the physical needs of foster children would ‘fundamentally alter’ the licensure system and is, therefore, not a reasonable accommodation.”
The plaintiff’s facial challenge to provisions of Michigan law governing foster care licensure also failed.
“DCWL has issued foster licenses to people with disabilities, meaning that it does not interpret the provisions to bar anyone and everyone with a disability from receiving a foster care license,” the court wrote. “So it does not preclude people with disabilities, no matter how little their ‘known condition’ would ‘affect’ caring for the child, from being foster parents. Nor does DCWL violate the ADA or Rehabilitation Act each time it applies these provisions. There are some cases, as here, where an applicant has a severe disability and has not proposed a reasonable accommodation. And there may be cases where an individual’s disability cannot be accommodated in a way to ‘ensure appropriate care of children.’ Rejecting a foster care license in those circumstances does not violate the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.”
Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment on her Equal Protection claims against the individual defendants. While she was able to demonstrate disparate treatment, the defendants satisfied rational basis review because the closure of her application was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring safe homes for foster children, the court found.
