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Where summary disposition was awarded to the defendant in a dispute over counsel fees, the trial court erred in finding the complaint untimely and in finding that the parol evidence rule barred the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim.
Reversed and remanded.
“In this dispute over attorney fees, plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(I)(2) (opposing party entitled to judgment).
“In November 2015, defendant’s son was shot and killed by a sheriff’s deputy in California. In February 2016, defendant allegedly contacted plaintiff Ernest Jarrett to help her persuade California officials to pursue criminal charges against the deputy. In accordance with the parties’ purported oral agreement, plaintiffs claimed they devoted about 73.5 hours of work to defendant’s case at a rate of $350 per hour, totaling about $31,222.46 in costs and attorney fees. Defendant, however, failed to pay. Nearly six years later, plaintiffs brought suit, alleging claims of breach of express and implied contract, account stated, and unjust enrichment. Defendant answered, denying plaintiffs’ allegations and asserting only three affirmative defenses. Relevant to this appeal, defendant did not assert a statute-of-limitations defense.
“Plaintiffs first claim that the trial court erred by disregarding the applicable court rules and considering defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We disagree.
“Plaintiffs additionally claim that the trial court erred by finding their case was time-barred by the statute of limitations, dismissing their equitable claims, granting summary disposition on the basis of the parol-evidence rule, and not granting their motion for summary disposition. We agree that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendant, but plaintiffs are not entitled to summary disposition.
“Here, plaintiffs’ billing statement and letter to defendant did not specify a specific payment due date. With no set date of performance, plaintiffs’ claims would have accrued only after a reasonable time had passed. Because such a determination is necessarily a factual question for a jury, … the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendant on these grounds. Similarly, the trial court impliedly ruled that plaintiffs’ unjust-enrichment claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Because this ruling was also based on its erroneous determination of the reasonable time for performance in this case, … the trial court necessarily erred in dismissing this claim as well.
“We note that defendant relies on Seyburn, Kahn, Ginn, Bess, Deitch & Serlin, PC v Bakshi, 483 Mich 345; 771 NW2d 411 (2009), to support her contention that plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations because their claim accrued when ‘the attorney-client relationship was terminated in September, with confirmation in October.’
“Seyburn‘s holding is distinguishable from this case. The oral agreement under which plaintiffs seek to recover was not an attorney-client relationship that required judicial approval before it could be terminated; the oral agreement solely governed plaintiffs’ efforts to secure a criminal prosecution of the deputy who shot defendant’s son. … Because, unlike Seyburn, there was no attorney-client relationship under the oral agreement that necessitated discharge by the trial court, the general rules governing the accrual of a breach-of-contract claim apply, and the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendant.
“Here, plaintiffs alleged that the oral agreement and written contingency-fee agreement were two separate and distinct contracts. According to plaintiffs, under the terms of the oral agreement, they would represent defendant in her efforts to have the sheriff’s deputy criminally prosecuted for the death of her son. The contingency-fee agreement, on the other hand, concerned defendant’s civil case to collect damages arising from the wrongful death of her son. Although plaintiffs admitted that some aspects of the work performed for these cases overlapped, evidence of the oral agreement was not introduced to alter the terms of the written contingency-fee agreement. Rather, plaintiffs were attempting to collect under the terms of entirely different agreement. The trial court, therefore, erred by finding that the parol-evidence rule barred plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim.
“In her affidavit, defendant denied that any other fee agreement existed other than the contingency-fee agreement. Defendant claimed that she did not agree to pay plaintiffs $350 per hour for the work identified in their billing statement, rather, plaintiffs incurred those expenses ‘as part of [their] initial efforts to strengthen [their] bond with [her] and perhaps to strengthen the civil case. Moreover, Plaintiff[s’] billing records [did] not reliably track [Jarrett’s] time.’ Reading this evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, there remains a question of fact regarding the existence, and, by extension, the enforceability, of the alleged oral agreement. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not entitled to summary disposition.”
