Where an order to euthanize a respondent’s dog has been challenged on appeal, that order must be vacated because the district court erred when rendering its findings and decision regarding provocation, including by failing to properly utilize an objective reasonable-person standard.
“In this case involving a dangerous animal complaint under MCL 287.322, respondent appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s order affirming the district court’s order to euthanize respondent’s dog, Chance. We reverse the circuit court’s order of affirmance, vacate the district court’s order, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. …
“This case arises out of the injuries that a guest at the Port Huron home of respondent Pamela Wickings suffered on April 6, 2024, when Chance—an American Bulldog that weighs about 80 pounds—bit her on the nose. Respondent lived in the home with her boyfriend, Richard Macumber; her granddaughter, DR; and Chance. At the time of the incident, Chance was three years old and had lived with respondent for the entirety of the dog’s life. Most of the key facts are undisputed, except with respect to whether the guest was waving a shoe when Chance bit her. The guest noticed that Chance had her shoe by him. She then got down on the floor, put her face within less than six inches of Chance’s face, and sternly scolded him in a loud voice. Chance then bit off a portion of her nose.
“At the district court hearing, the guest denied that she was holding the shoe while scolding Chance. However, Macumber and DR testified that the guest was waving the shoe while scolding Chance. …
“At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court ruled that Chance was subject to an order of euthanasia as a ‘dangerous animal’ under MCL 287.322. The district court found that the guest did not provoke Chance and that she suffered a permanent and serious disfigurement. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s order. …
“Respondent argues that the district court erred when rendering its findings and decision regarding provocation, including by failing to properly utilize an objective reasonable-person standard. We agree. …
“Until today, there is no published authority interpreting or applying the definition of ‘provoke’ set forth in MCL 287.321(d). …
“… The term ‘ordinary and reasonable person’ is a legal term of art that denotes an objective standard. … The legal meaning of such terminology was materially the same in the 1980s, when MCL 287.321 was enacted by 1988 PA 426, effective March 30, 1989. … The reference to an ‘ordinary dog’ in MCL 287.321(d) also indicates that an objective standard applies.
“Therefore, the district court should have applied a wholly objective standard in determining whether the guest’s actions constituted provocation. That is, the district court should have considered whether getting down on the ground and putting one’s face less than six inches from the face of a large dog that had a chewable object, such as a shoe, that had been next to the dog, while simultaneously scolding the dog in a loud voice while possibly waving a shoe above the dog’s head, constituted ‘a willful act or omission that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude is likely to precipitate the bite or attack by an ordinary dog or animal.’ MCL 287.321(d) (emphasis added). …
“The district court thus relied in part on the guest’s subjective thoughts or feelings in concluding that her actions did not constitute provocation. By failing to apply a purely objective standard, the district court misconstrued or misapplied the statutory definition of ‘provoke’ in MCL 287.321(d). We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order of affirmance, vacate the district court’s order, and remand the case to the district court to make the appropriate findings and decision under the objective standard required by MCL 287.321(d). …
“We reverse the circuit court’s order of affirmance, vacate the district court’s order, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”