Where an appeal has been filed challenging several orders concerning the respondents’ claims to surplus proceeds generated by tax-foreclosure sales, the orders must be reversed because the respondents did not pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period, so their claims were time-barred before MCL 211.78t was enacted in 2020.
“In these consolidated appeals, petitioner, the Treasurer of the State of Michigan, challenges several orders concerning respondents’ claims to surplus proceeds generated by tax-foreclosure sales. Petitioner foreclosed on and sold parcels of real property previously owned by respondents in 2014. In late 2024 and early 2025, respondents sought to recover the surplus proceeds from those sales under MCL 211.78t of the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq.
“In Docket No. 376481, the trial court entered a July 8, 2025 order requiring petitioner to pay respondent Gordon Beck the surplus proceeds generated by the sale of his property. Petitioner appeals that order as of right, and Beck cross-appeals the portion of the order denying his request for interest. In Docket No. 376482, petitioner appeals by leave granted the trial court’s June 27, 2025 order denying petitioner’s motion for summary disposition with respect to Beck’s claim. Petitioner also appeals by leave granted substantially identical orders entered on July 10, 2025 denying its motions for summary disposition with respect to the claims of respondents Stefanie Dever, Douglas and Valerie Webster, and Nicholas Roy in Docket Nos. 376653, 376655, and 376656, respectively.
“These appeals present a common dispositive question: When did respondents’ respective claims accrue? Was it (a) in 2014, when the foreclosure sales generated surplus proceeds that petitioner retained; (b) at some later date after the enactment of MCL 211.78t in 2020; or (c) when our Supreme Court held in 2024 that the statute applies retrospectively? See Schafer v Kent Co, 515 Mich 1; ___ NW3d ___ (2024). We conclude that given respondents did not pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period, their claims were time-barred before MCL 211.78t was enacted in 2020. Neither Schafer nor its predecessor, Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, 505 Mich 429; 952 NW2d 434 (2020), revived claims that were already extinguished. Accordingly, we reverse. …
“Petitioner argues that respondents’ claims for surplus proceeds accrued when the tax-foreclosure sales occurred in 2014 and therefore became time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations well before the Legislature enacted MCL 211.78t. We agree. …
“The central issue on appeal concerns when respondents’ claims accrued. Petitioner contends that respondents’ claims accrued when their properties were sold in 2014. Respondents conversely maintain that their claims accrued only when our Supreme Court decided Schafer, because before that decision was issued, they lacked a statutory cause of action under MCL 211.78t. The trial court adopted respondents’ view. We disagree and conclude that the trial court erred. …
“Ultimately, because respondents’ claims accrued in 2014 and became time-barred in 2017, the trial court erred by denying petitioner’s motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
“Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of petitioner.”