Where a defendant employer has moved for summary judgment on a plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims under Title VII and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, the employer’s motion should be allowed because the plaintiff has not identified a similarly situated male employee who was treated more favorably.
“Plaintiff Tiara Williams (‘Williams’ or ‘Plaintiff’) initiated this employment action against her former employer, Mastronardi Produce-USA, Inc. (‘Mastronardi’ or ‘Defendant’), for claims of harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (‘Title VII’), and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §37.2101 et seq. (‘ELCRA’). …
“Mastronardi asserts that Williams’ prima facie case fails because she has not identified a similarly situated male comparator that was similar in all relevant aspects, engaged in the same conduct, and treated more favorably. … Mastronardi points to the Court’s previous order granting summary judgment on Williams’ race discrimination claims based on the same failure to identify a comparator. … Williams argues that comparator evidence ‘is not the exclusive means of proving discrimination’ and ‘is not required in every case.’ … Instead, Williams asserts she is only required to present evidence which ‘permits a reasonable inference that an adverse action occurred because of plaintiff’s protected characteristics.’ … The Court disagrees with Williams.
“As argued by Defendants, Jackson [v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 776-78 (6th Cir. 2016)] does not stand for the proposition that Plaintiff need not identify a similarly situated comparator. … To the contrary, Jackson states the four elements required to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination — including element (4) a similarly situated non-protected employee that was treated more favorably. Jackson, 814 F.3d at 776. The Sixth Circuit goes on to identify factors to consider in evaluating where a comparator is similarly situated for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case. … Providing a similarly situated non-protected employee is a fundamental principal in discrimination cases. …
“… Plaintiff has not identified a similarly situated male employee that was treated more favorably. To the extent that Williams argues that her comparator does not have to be similar in ‘every conceivable respect and that courts must avoid applying an overly rigid comparator analysis,’ … she still has failed to identify any comparator that would be similarly situated. Consequently, Counts VII and VIII fail as a matter of law.”