Where a judge allowed a motion by two defendant insurance companies to dismiss a claim for coverage under legal malpractice policies, the judge did not err in concluding that the policies’ plain language unambiguously precluded coverage.
“This case involves the contractual interpretation of two legal-malpractice insurance policies under Michigan law. The underpinning of the case began in January 2017, when Lauren Bridges filed a medical-malpractice lawsuit in Alaska state court. That lawsuit was ultimately dismissed in January 2022 because Bridges’s counsel, the Michigan-based law firm of McKeen & Associates, P.C. (McKeen), had failed to respond on her behalf to the healthcare providers’ motions for summary judgment. Bridges accordingly asserted a legal-malpractice claim against McKeen the following month.
“During its representation of Bridges, McKeen maintained legal-malpractice insurance policies with three different insurers: Maxum Indemnity Company (Maxum), StarStone Specialty Insurance Company (StarStone), and Landmark American Insurance Company (Landmark). Each insurer, however, refused to defend or indemnify McKeen against Bridges’s legal-malpractice claim.
“McKeen thereafter settled with Bridges and assigned to her all of its rights under the three insurance policies. Bridges then brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that her legal-malpractice claim was covered under each policy. Maxum and Landmark (but not StarStone) moved to dismiss. The district court granted their motions in November 2024, concluding that the policies’ plain language unambiguously precluded coverage. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. …
“The sole issue on appeal with regard to Maxum is whether McKeen timely reported Bridges’s legal-malpractice claim. …
“Here, McKeen did not report an actual claim by Bridges until February 2022, which was long after the end of both the Policy Period (May 2018 to May 2019) and the Optional Extended Reporting Period (July 2019 to July 2021). …
“Because the notice language requires potential claims to be reported during the Policy Period (which by definition excludes the Extended Reporting Period), Section VII.B. unambiguously precludes coverage under Maxum’s legal-malpractice policy. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Bridges’s contract claims against Maxum. …
“The district court determined that Bridges’s legal-malpractice claim is not covered under the Landmark Policy because it falls under the exclusion set forth in Section III.C. of the StarStone Policy. Specifically, the court reasoned that the Wrongful Act ‘giving rise to [Bridges’s] claim was McKeen’s failure to timely respond to summary judgment motions in 2018, before the retroactive date of May 2, 2019,’ and that ‘[w]rongful acts that occurred before that date are clearly excluded from coverage under the Landmark policy.’ On that basis, the court dismissed Bridges’s contract claims against Landmark.
“Bridges does not challenge this reasoning in her opening brief. … Instead, she advances an entirely new argument for why dismissal was improper. Bridges contends that because the Landmark Policy is a follow-form policy that incorporates the StarStone Policy, ‘[d]etermining Landmark’s exposure will require the interpretation of the StarStone Policy.’ But because StarStone answered Bridges’s complaint instead of filing a motion to dismiss, she argues that dismissing her contract claims against Landmark would be ‘premature’ and ‘risks piecemeal adjudication and inconsistent rulings regarding the same underlying policy language and facts.’
“The main problem with Bridges’s argument is that she failed to raise it before the district court. …
“And even if we were to reach the merits of this argument, it would fail. … Because Bridges does not contend that either the Landmark Policy or the StarStone Policy is ambiguous, there is no reason why we cannot interpret those policies at this stage of the proceedings. Moreover, Bridges’s assertion that granting Landmark’s motion to dismiss would result in ‘inconsistent rulings’ with respect to Bridges’s future claims against StarStone is unpersuasive. Coverage under the Landmark Policy and the StarStone Policy is coextensive, and under the policies’ plain language, Landmark is not obligated to cover Bridges’s claim. We therefore have no reason to believe that the district court would reach a different conclusion as to StarStone.
“Because Bridges advances no other argument as to why her legal-malpractice claim should be covered under the Landmark Policy, there is no valid basis to disturb the district court’s ruling. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Bridges’s contract claims against Landmark. …
“For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”