Where a plaintiff sued defendants for medical malpractice that allegedly occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, an award of summary disposition to defendants based on their respective claims of immunity under the Pandemic Healthcare Immunity Act must be reversed because the defendants have not shown entitlement to PHCIA immunity as a matter of law.
“Applying MCL 691.1475 as interpreted by the published authority of this Court, it is clear that defendants in this case have not made a viable claim to immunity under the PHCIA and are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that basis. … Consider each defendant in turn. …
“Below, Beaumont argued that they were entitled to PHCIA immunity because (1) Beaumont qualified as a healthcare facility that provided services in support of the state’s battle against COVID-19, (2) the alleged deterioration of decedent’s pressure injuries occurred at the same time Beaumont was providing pandemic-related services, (3) plaintiff’s allegations fell within the time period during which statutory immunity applies, and (4) plaintiff did not allege gross negligence or another exception to PHCIA immunity. Beaumont repeats the same argument on appeal. Fatally, however, Beaumont failed to identify, in plaintiff’s allegations or otherwise, the legally requisite connection between Beaumont’s pandemic-related services and the negligence alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. Apart from the temporal relationship between plaintiff’s claims and the time during which Beaumont generally provided pandemic-related care, Beaumont made no argument and submitted no evidence that showed there was a nexus between the pandemic and the alleged negligence. As this Court has repeatedly stressed, such a temporal overlap, on its own, is insufficient for immunity to attach. … Beaumont argues that Skipper-Baines [v Bd of Hosp Managers for City of Flint, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 365137)] and Jokinen [v Beaumont Hosp Troy, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 370983)] are factually distinguishable, but this argument misses the forest for the trees. Regardless of any purported factual distinctions, Skipper-Baines, Jokinen, and Franklin [v McLaren Flint, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 366226)] all stand for the proposition that there must be a connection between pandemic-related services and the services that resulted in the alleged negligence. That requisite connection is absent from Beaumont’s arguments and evidence in support of its motion for summary disposition; accordingly, that motion, even taken as unopposed, fails to demonstrate that Beaumont is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the PHCIA.
“Perhaps in recognition of this deficiency, Beaumont makes a new argument for the first time on appeal: that decedent’s medical records, which plaintiff submitted with her brief on appeal, show that decedent was evaluated and tested for COVID-19 upon her admission to Beaumont, thereby demonstrating a sufficient connection for PHCIA immunity to apply. This argument suffers from procedural and substantive defects. As Beaumont itself points out, these records are not properly before us on appeal, as they were not part of the record below. ‘When reviewing a motion for summary disposition, this Court’s review is limited to review of the evidence properly presented to the trial court.’ Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 380; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). Accordingly, we cannot now consider such evidence, on plaintiff’s behalf or defendants’. … Furthermore, even if we were to do so, we do not see how the mere fact of COVID-19 testing upon admission, with nothing more, would provide proof of any connection between the pandemic and the alleged negligence in this case. …
“Hartford’s motion is similarly deficient. Like Beaumont, Hartford’s statutory argument under the PHCIA relied on the temporal overlap between the pandemic-related services it rendered in support of the state’s pandemic response and the services it provided to decedent. As for any connection between its pandemic-related services and the alleged negligence, Hartford only made the conclusory assertion that ‘[decedent’s] alleged injuries were that of multiple pressure ulcers, which allegedly deteriorated by reason of the health care services [Hartford] provided in support of this state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.’ Hartford similarly represents on appeal that it ‘modified its pressure ulcer care’ in response to the pandemic. But plaintiff’s complaint alleged nothing of the sort, and Hartford’s motion (and appellate brief, for that matter) did not develop a meaningful legal or factual argument in support of this claim. Hartford noted that a wound assessment performed on decedent on May 12, 2020, by Soua Kue, NP, was done via telehealth because of the pandemic, and attached to its motion a record of that assessment. That documentation, however, did not itself state the reason for the telehealth format of the May 12 assessment, and in any event, plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any negligence in connection with a wound assessment performed on May 12; indeed, it does not even mention a May 12 assessment or name Soua Kue, NP. We fail to see how this argument and evidence, even taken as unopposed, would be sufficient under controlling precedent to show the existence of the requisite connection between the pandemic and the alleged negligence in this case, such that Hartford would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the PHCIA on its basis. …
“Mission Point did not file its own motion for summary disposition or make any case for PHCIA immunity particular to the care that it provided to decedent. Instead, it simply concurred with the arguments raised in its co-defendants’ motions. Because those arguments fail, so too does Mission Point’s bid for judgment as a matter of law.
“In sum, the trial court erred when it awarded summary disposition to defendants because their motions, even when duly reviewed as unopposed, failed to show that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the PHCIA’s immunity provision. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”