The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Estate of Donovan L. Lewis v. City of Columbus sheds light on important issues relating to the collateral order doctrine and third parties’ rights to intervene.
The underlying merits of the case involve a Monell claim under Section 1983 that the Columbus police department maintains policies and customs of excessive force and racial discrimination. Because those claims implicate policies in the department’s collective bargaining agreement, which the Fraternal Order of Police negotiated, the FOP sought intervention as of right. It argued that the policy reforms suggested by the Plaintiff would undermine its statutory duties and contractual rights as the department’s “sole bargaining representative.” The district court, however, denied the request to intervene, and the FOP immediately appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
Judge Davis’s opinion for a unanimous panel held that, while appellate jurisdiction typically extends only to “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, Cohen’s collateral order doctrine conferred jurisdiction here. The FOP met all three criteria under the Cohen doctrine, which allows interlocutory appeals of orders that (1) conclusively resolve the issue, (2) involve an important question separate from the merits, and (3) are effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The Court emphasized that the district court’s denial, though “without prejudice,” does not defeat finality. The district court’s order functioned as “a complete denial permitting an interlocutory appeal, despite its express invitation for [the FOP] to renew its motion should the case progress to equitable remedies.” The Court noted a Supreme Court case, Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, that suggests “orders denying intervention in any respect fall within the potential reach of the Cohen doctrine.”
That brought the Court to the FOP’s right to intervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) allows a party to intervene if it claims an interest relating to the action and is so situated that “disposing of the action may . . . impede” its ability to protect its interest, “unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” The Court held that the FOP satisfied all four elements for intervention as of right. The FOP’s intervention motion was timely, and exclusion would impair its interests in the collectively bargained policies that the lawsuit challenges. The FOP also had a substantial legal interest in defending the policies that it negotiated, especially since the city’s interests and litigation strategy are likely to diverge from the FOP’s, suggesting that the city does not adequately advance the FOP’s interests. In confirming the FOP’s right to intervene, the Court emphasized that intervention rights are broad.
This decision underscores two points: First, orders denying intervention can be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine. Second, the Sixth Circuit interprets the rules underlying the right to intervention liberally when litigation threatens contractual or statutory rights and obligations. This decision shows that both the trial and appellate courthouse doors may be open to third parties with a live stake in the case.
