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Where the city of Grand Rapids sought declaratory and injunctive relief after the Michigan Department of Civil Rights filed charges against it, the Court of Claims did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction but the Court of Claims was correct in finding that the city failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
“Plaintiff appeals as of right an order of the Court of Claims granting summary disposition in favor of defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and MCR 2.116(C)(8). We reverse in part and affirm in part. …
“This case arises out of multiple ongoing administrative proceedings against plaintiff under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. Plaintiff’s police department has been the subject of multiple civil-rights complaints filed with defendant, the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR). MDCR proceedings involve an ‘investigation’ phase followed by a ‘charge’ phase. The MDCR investigates and decides whether a charge of discrimination should be issued on behalf of the aggrieved party after a civil-rights complaint is filed. Mich Admin Code, R 37.6(1). If the MDCR issues a charge, the charge is heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who makes a recommendation to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, and the Commission issues a final decision. Mich Admin Code, R 37.12, 37.16. The final decision is appealable to the Circuit Court. Mich Admin Code, R 37.18.
“Relevant to this case, there were 13 complaints filed with the MDCR against plaintiff. The MDCR filed charges in response to three of the complaints, and plaintiff unsuccessfully sought dismissal of those charges before the ALJ on statute-of-limitations grounds. Plaintiff argued the three-year statute of limitations in the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), MCL 600.101 et seq., MCL 600.5805(2), applied to administrative proceedings under ELCRA. Plaintiff applied for interlocutory relief in the circuit court, which was denied, and ultimately those three proceedings were dismissed for unrelated reasons. In one of the other investigations, plaintiff refused to comply with the MDCR’s discovery order because plaintiff argued the proceeding was time-barred.
“Plaintiff then commenced this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Court of Claims, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the statute of limitations found at MCL 600.5805(2) applies to issuing charges in administrative ELCRA proceedings, and (2) injunctive relief from further proceedings in the claims that plaintiff argued were barred by the statute of limitations. After plaintiff filed its complaint in the Court of Claims, defendant filed a separate complaint in circuit court requesting that plaintiff show cause for not responding to the discovery order. The circuit court stayed the show-cause proceeding pending resolution of the Court of Claims case and this appeal.
“Defendant then moved to dismiss the case in the Court of Claims under MCR 2.116(C)(4) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and under MCR 2.116(C)(8) for failure to state a claim. The Court of Claims found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because, under MCL 600.6419(5), the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from administrative agencies. The Court also found that the three-year statute of limitations in the Revised Judicature Act was inapplicable to administrative proceedings. Thus, the Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss under both MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(8). …
“Plaintiff first argues that the Court of Claims improperly granted summary disposition for defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because the Court of Claims has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action for declaratory relief against defendant, and plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies. We agree. …
“Here, the administrative proceedings against plaintiff are not complete, and plaintiff has not exhausted its administrative remedies. However, the expense and inconvenience of continuing administrative proceedings that plaintiff argues are time-barred is the exact harm plaintiff seeks to avoid. Plaintiff’s claim is based solely on an issue of statutory interpretation. Neither fact-finding, administrative expertise, nor further administrative proceedings are required to rule on this issue. Thus, we hold that plaintiff was excused from exhausting administrative remedies and summary disposition was improper under MCR 2.116(C)(4). …
“Plaintiff next argues that summary disposition was improper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because the phrase ‘all actions to recover damages’ found in the three-year statute of limitations applicable to ELCRA claims refers to actions in a court and administrative proceedings, and therefore applies to the MDCR issuing charges in administrative proceedings. We disagree. …
“… Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that the three-year statute of limitations applies to administrative ELCRA proceedings conducted by the MDCR and also sought injunctive relief preventing further proceedings in time-barred complaints. However, as discussed, the statute of limitations in question does not apply to administrative ELCRA proceedings. Thus, even assuming the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint were true, the relief plaintiff seeks cannot be granted as a matter of law and dismissal was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8). …
“We find the Court of Claims had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter. Thus, we reverse the order of the Court of Claims granting defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). The Court of Claims was correct, however, in finding plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm the order granting defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).”
