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Where a plaintiff checked himself into a hospital after experiencing mental health symptoms and a defendant off-duty police officer intervened as medical staff sought to restrain the plaintiff to administer a shot, and the plaintiff later sued for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and multiple state-law torts, it was not error to grant the officer summary judgment on all of the plaintiff’s claims except for common-law assault and battery, as the plaintiff has not identified a violation of a clearly established right..
Affirmed.
“In 2021, Miles Guptill checked himself into a Tennessee hospital after experiencing mental health symptoms. As medical staff sought to restrain Guptill to administer a shot, off-duty Police Officer Joel Gunn intervened. Gunn first twisted Guptill’s arm behind his back and then punched his head into a cinderblock wall when Guptill persisted in his refusal of the shot and tried to pull away. Guptill suffered head trauma from the blow. He later sued Gunn and the City of Chattanooga for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and multiple state-law torts. The district court granted Gunn summary judgment on all of Guptill’s claims except for common-law assault and battery and granted the City summary judgment in full. Guptill now appeals. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM.
“Gunn argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Guptill’s §1983 excessive force claim.
“Based on Guptill’s physical resistance, repeated questions, and the fact that he was under emergency detention, the district court concluded that a reasonable officer could believe that Guptill was experiencing a medical emergency.
“We next ask whether some degree of force was reasonably necessary to ameliorate an immediate threat.
“Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Guptill, no reasonable juror could find Gunn objectively unreasonable in believing that some degree of force was necessary to help medical staff restrain Guptill to administer the medication—which would then ameliorate the immediate threat.
“Finally, we consider whether the amount of force Gunn used—punching Guptill’s head into the cinderblock wall—was more than reasonably necessary.
“Considering the totality of circumstances in the context of a medical emergency, a reasonable juror could conclude that Gunn’s punch was excessive and violated constitutional standards. Guptill has therefore satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. We continue to the second prong, where his claim falters.
“Here, the right at issue is whether a person who is experiencing a mental health emergency and physically resisting treatment in a non-threatening manner has the clearly established right not to be punched by a law enforcement officer.
“Even viewing the facts in Guptill’s favor, he has not identified a violation of a clearly established right. No binding caselaw Guptill identified or that we could find has determined that an officer responding to a perceived medical emergency and a partially restrained patient who is passively resisting medication cannot use a single punch to enforce compliance when that individual pulls away from the officer, ‘even if the officer was not entirely sure’ about the resistance. … Thus, Guptill cannot prevail on the clearly-established-law prong of qualified immunity.”
Concurring opinion
THAPAR, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. “I join the majority’s thoughtful opinion with one observation. The Supreme Court has ‘not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.’ District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 66 n.8 (2018). Rather, it has repeatedly reserved that question.
“If the Supreme Court isn’t sure, how can an officer be? … It’s easy for us to say officers should know what Sixth Circuit precedent prohibits—and how to correctly apply that precedent in a rapidly unfolding emergency. After all, we aren’t the ones risking our lives in the line of duty. Unlike us, ‘law enforcement officers must protect the public in an uncertain and dangerous world, not the cold crucible of the courtroom.’ Rudolph v. Babinec, 939 F.3d 742, 755 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It’s even worse to suggest that officers must pore over not only our cases, but also those from our eleven sister circuits. To the extent our case law suggests they must do so, it’s incorrect. While the majority references this case law, it doesn’t rely upon it, so I concur.”
